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Abstract. Online Social Media represent a pervasive source of informa-
tion able to reach a huge audience. Sadly, recent studies show how on-
line social bots (automated, often malicious accounts, populating social
networks and mimicking genuine users) are able to amplify the dissemi-
nation of (fake) information by orders of magnitude. Using Twitter as a
benchmark, in this work we focus on what we define credulous users, i.e.,
human-operated accounts with a high percentage of bots among their
followings. Being more exposed to the harmful activities of social bots,
credulous users may run the risk of being more influenced than other
users; even worse, although unknowingly, they could become spreaders
of misleading information (e.g., by retweeting bots). We design and de-
velop a supervised classifier to automatically recognize credulous users.
The best tested configuration achieves an accuracy of 93.27% and AUC-
ROC of 0.93, thus leading to positive and encouraging results.
Keywords: Twitter · Humans-Bots Interactions · Gullibility · Disinfor-
mation · Social Networks · Data Mining · Supervised Learning
1 Introduction
The diffusion of information on Social Media is often supported by automated
accounts, controlled totally or in part by computer algorithms, called bots. Un-
fortunately, a dominant and worrisome use of automated accounts is far from
being benign: malicious bots are purposely created to distribute spam, sponsor
public characters and, ultimately, induce a bias within the public opinion [13].
Especially, their malicious activities are of high efficacy when performed on a
targeted audience [5,4] to, e.g., generate misconception or encourage hate cam-
paigns [7]. Recent work in [24,29] demonstrate that bots are particularly active
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in spreading low credibility content and amplifying their significance. Moreover,
human-operated accounts contribute to the diffusion of disinformation by, e.g.,
retweeting and/or liking fake content.
In a previous work [3], the authors shed light on so called credulous Twitter
users assuming, with a harmless abuse of language, that they refer to human-
operated accounts with a high percentage of bots as friends. Unlike [3], where the
authors performed an analysis involving the friends of a set of human-operated
accounts - a highly time consuming task - here we design and develop a classifier
to find out credulous Twitter users, by considering a number of features that
do not take the friendship with bots into account. Starting by considering a set
of features commonly employed in the literature to detect bots [26,10], we end
up with a lightweight classifier, in terms of costs for gathering the data needed
for the feature engineering phase. The classification performance achieves very
encouraging results – an accuracy of 93.27% and an AUC (Area Under the ROC
curve) equal to 0.93.
We believe that automatically detecting credulous users is a promising line
of research. Such an investigation could help researchers to: 1. better understand
the characteristics of those users more polarized and/or more willing to be influ-
enced; 2. unveil low-credibility and/or deceptive content and limite their online
diffusion; 3. devise alternative strategies for bot detection by concentrating the
analysis on the friends of credulous users; 4. improve the users’ awareness about
threats to data trustworthiness.
The following section presents the approach for the automatic detection
of credulous Twitter users, while Section 3 presents the experimental results.
Section 4 discusses the outcome and suggests further investigations. Section 5
presents related work in the area, arguing on the differences, the contributions
and the novelty w.r.t. our work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The approach
2.1 Datasets
We consider three publicly available datasets4: CR15 [10], CR17 [12], and VR17 [26].
From the merging of these three datasets, we obtain a unique labeled dataset
(human-operated/bot) of 12,961 accounts - 7,165 bots and 5,796 humans. We
use this dataset to train a bot detector, as described in Section 2.2. To this end,
we use the Java Twitter API5, and for each account we collect: tweets (up to
3,200), mentions (up to 100), IDs of friends and followers (up to 5k).
The identification of credulous users follows the approach presented in [3].
To this end, we need to detect the amount of bots which are friends of the
5,796 human-operated accounts. Due to the rate limits of the Twitter APIs and
to the huge amount of friends possibly belonging to these human-operated ac-
counts, we consider only those accounts with a list of friends lower than or equal
4 Bot Repository Datasets: https://goo.gl/87Kzcr
5 Twitter API: https://goo.gl/njcjr1
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to 400 [3]. This leads to a dataset of 2,838 human-operated accounts, namely
Humans2Consider hereafter. By crawling the data related to their friends, we
overall acquire information related to 421,121 Twitter accounts.
2.2 Bot Detection
A bot detection phase is required to discriminate bots and genuine accounts
in the dataset of selected friends. The literature offers a plethora of successful
approaches [13]; however, also due to the capabilities of evolved spambots to
evade detection [12], the performances of the diverse techniques degenerate over
time [19]. Furthermore, some bot detectors are available online, but not fully
usable due to restrictions in their terms of use, see, e.g., [8]. To overcome these
issues, we design and develop a supervised approach, which mixes features from
popular scientific work and novel features here introduced.
Regarding the features, we consider two sets. The first one derives from
Botometer [26], a popular bot detector6. In addition to the original Botome-
ter features [26], we also include: the CAP7 (Complete Automation Probability)
score, the Scores8, the number of tweets and mentions; we call Botometer+ this
augmented set of features. The second feature set is inherited from [10], where a
classifier was designed to detect fake Twitter followers. We use almost all their
ClassA features9, except the one about duplicated pictures, because it was not
possible for us to verify whether the same profile picture was used twice; we call
ClassA- this reduced set of features. The conjunction of the two sets of features
is referred in the following as ALL features.
We use 19 learning algorithms to train our classifier (with a 10-fold cross
validation) and we compare their classification capabilities with respect to the
three feature sets (Botometer+, ClassA- and ALL features). The classification
performances are evaluated according to: percentage of accuracy, precision, re-
call, F-measure (F1 ), and Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC ). On the most
accurate classifier, Hyper-Parameter tuning is performed. The tuned classifier is
then used to label the friends of the Humans2Consider dataset (see Section 2.1).
2.3 Identification of Credulous Twitter Users
The identification of credulous users can be performed with multiple strategies,
since there are various aspects that may contribute to spot those users more
exposed to the malicious activities of bots. In our previous work [3], we intro-
duced a set of rules to discern whether a genuine user is a credulous one. These
rules allow to rank users by relying on the ratio of bots over the user’s list of
friends. Here, we inherit these rules to rank the users in our dataset (see Section
2.1), but further ranking strategies can be also considered. Our goal is to build
6 https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
7 Complete Automation Probability: https://tinyurl.com/yxp3wqzh
8 English/Universal Score: https://tinyurl.com/y2skbmqc
9 ClassA features require only information available in the profile of the account [10].
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a ground truth of credulous users to derive an assessed characterization of these
accounts. Applying the approach defined in [3], we identified as credulous 316
users in Humans2Consider. This constitutes the input data for the next step. We
note that the approach in [3] is very expensive in terms of data gathering. For
example, for the investigated dataset, it requires 421k users’ account information
and 833 million of tweets.
2.4 Classification of Credulous Twitter Users
Goal of this phase is to build a decision model to automatically classify a Twitter
account as credulous or not. As ground-truth, we consider the 316 accounts
identified as credulous according to the process described in Section 2.3.
We experiment the same learning algorithms and the same feature sets con-
sidered in Section 2.2, with 10 cross-fold validation. However, for credulous users
classification, the learning algorithms take as input a very unbalanced dataset:
we have 2,838 human-operated accounts (see Section 2.1) and, among them, 316
have been identified as credulous accounts (see Section 2.3). To avoid working
with unbalanced datasets, we split the sets of not credulous users into smaller
portions, equal to the number of credulous users. We randomly select a number
of not credulous users equal to the number of credulous ones; then, we unify
these instances in a new dataset (hereinafter referred to as fold). Then, we re-
peat this process on previously un-selected sets, until there are no more not
credulous instances. Such procedure has been inspired by the under-sampling
iteration methodology, for strongly unbalanced datasets [18]. Each learning al-
gorithm is trained on each fold. To evaluate the classification performances on
the whole dataset, and not just on individual folds, we compute the average of
the single performance values, for each evaluation metric.
3 Experimental Results
All the experiments are performed with Weka [28], a tool providing the imple-
mentation of several machine learning algorithms. In the following, we present
the main results obtained for bot detection and credulous classification, all the
details are publicly available: https://tinyurl.com/y4l632g5.
The first column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the set of features considered for
learning (i.e., ALL features, Botometer+, ClassA-, see Section 2.2). The second
column reports a subset of the adopted machine learning algorithms whose name
is abbreviated according to the Weka’s notation and reported in the following:
IBk: K-nearest neighbours [1], NB: Naive Bayes [17], SMO: Sequential Minimal
Optimization [22], JRip: RIPPER [9], MLP: Multi-Layer Perceptron [21], RF:
Random Forest [6], REP: Reduced-Error Pruning [23], 1R [15]
The remaining columns report the evaluation metrics mentioned above.
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evaluation metrics
alg accuracy precision recall F1 AUC
ALL features
SMO 98.04 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
JRip 97.92 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99
RF 98.33 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00
Botometer+
SMO 97.64 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
JRip 97.61 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98
RF 97.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00
ClassA-
IBk 91.03 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.91
JRip 94.38 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.96
RF 95.84 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.99
Table 1: Results for bot detection
evaluation metrics
alg accuracy precision recall F1 AUC
ALL features
IBk 89.69 0.74 0.73 0.90 0.96
1R 93.27 0.99 0.88 0.93 0.93
REP 93.07 0.99 0.88 0.93 0.94
Botometer+
IBk 65.03 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.70
JRip 66.42 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.67
RF 67.81 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.73
ClassA-
IBk 92.59 0.74 0.73 0.92 0.97
1R 93.27 0.99 0.88 0.93 0.93
REP 93.09 0.98 0.88 0.93 0.95
Table 2: Results for credulous detection
Regarding bot detection, Table 1 shows that all the machine learning algo-
rithms well behave, regardless of the feature set. Random Forest is the one that
performs best. When the set ALL features is used, the results are: accuracy =
98.33%, F1 = 0.98 and AUC = 1.00; and after the tuning phase, we obtain a
final accuracy = 98.41%.
Table 2 shows that ALL features and ClassA- have good and quite simi-
lar classification performances, contrary to Botometer+. Both ALL features and
ClassA- demonstrate their efficacy to discriminate credulous users. On the con-
trary, the Botometer+’s features properly work for bot detection tasks only.
Going into deeper details, in Table 2 we can notice that the 1R algorithm ob-
tains the best accuracy percentage (93.27% with σ = 3.22) and F-score (0.93),
but not the highest AUC (0.93). It is worth noting that the values of the 1R al-
gorithm are exactly the same when considering ALL features and ClassA-. This
means that the algorithm selects ClassA-’s features only, the ones from Botome-
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ter+ are useless in this case. This is a relevant result since we recall that ClassA-
features refer to the profile of accounts and it is less expensive to collect them.
4 Discussion
The results in Table 2 show the capability of our approach to automatically
discriminate those Twitter users with a large number of bots as friends, namely
credulous, without explicitly considering the features of the latter, which would
imply a very high cost in terms of data gathering. To better understand this
point, we recall that the approach in [3] for the identification of credulous users
needs to crawl a large amount of data, due to the necessity of extending the
analysis to the friends of a Twitter account. In the specific case under investi-
gation, this means to retrieve information for more than 400k user accounts, 11
millions of tweet mentions, and more than 820 millions of tweets. As opposite,
the credulous detector here proposed requires to gather the profile information
of 2,838 accounts only. The classification performances are really promising, with
the best accuracy 93.27%, best F1 0.93, best AUC 0.93. We remark that such
results have been achieved by relying on so called ClassA- features only, i.e.,
features extracted from the account profile. It is peculiar how the features useful
to discriminate credulous genuine accounts are features belonging to the account
profile only. This preliminary result calls for three further investigations: 1. to
compare the range of values assumed by these features when detecting credulous
accounts with the one assumed to detect social bots (as in [10]); 2. to explore
the reason why more complex features (such as the ones of Botometer) do not
seem to give good results to find credulous users; 3. to perform a deeper analysis
on the importance of each specific feature when discriminating credulous users,
by means, e.g., of Principal Component Analysis [28]).
Finally, even if the design of a bot detector is not the primary goal of this pa-
per, but only a mean through which we obtain the ground-truth for training the
credulous user classifier, we notice that, compared to the performances reported
in [12,29], our bot detector achieves very good classification performances. This
strengthens the robustness of the ground truth obtained in Section 2.3, since the
friends’ nature evaluation is assessed by means of a very accurate classifier.
5 Related Work
Our work is related to all those approaches that investigate peculiar features of
social networks users. We discuss the ones we find more relevant for our approach,
with the caveat that the presented literature review is far from being exhaustive.
A survey on users’ behaviour in social networks is proposed in [16]: it is re-
marked that the recipients of shared information should be chosen, in a more
precautionary way, by taking into account more real-life relationships and less
virtual links. Our approach works exactly in the direction of enhancing the aware-
ness of users, by classifying the ones more exposed to attacks of social bots.
Information spreading on Twitter is investigated in [20], where the authors
demonstrate that the probability of spreading a given piece of information is
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higher when promoted by multiple sources. This supports our attempt to analyze
the percentage of bots within the friends of human-operated Twitter accounts,
as a symptom for being more tempted to disinformation.
In [2], human behaviour on Facebook is analyzed by building graphs that
capture sequence of activities. Behavioural patterns that do not match any of the
known benign models likely signal malicious objectives. Similarly, the realization
of a classifier to automatically recognize credulous users is the first step to derive
their sequence of activities and, hopefully, peculiar behavioral patterns.
In [11,14], a behavioural analysis of bots and humans on Twitter is performed,
to draw fundamental differences between the two groups. Specifically, the former
demonstrates how, despite a higher level of synchronization characterizing bot
accounts, the human behaviour on Twitter is far from being random. The latter
defines a ‘credibility score’ as a measure of how many tweets by bots are present
in the timeline of an account. Our work supports the discrimination of credulous
users and it may lead to a deeper characterization of human accounts.
To the best of our knowledge, few research explores ways to automatically
recognize those Twitter users susceptible to attacks of social bots or exposed
to disinformation. A notable example in [27] builds on interactions (mentions,
replies, retweets and friendship) between genuine and bot accounts, to obtain a
ground truth of users susceptible to social bots. Then, similar to our approach,
different learning algorithms have been adopted to train a classifier. Contrary
to their approach, the current work is able to classify users close to social bots
with lightweight features, all computed from data available in the user’s profile.
Another brand new line of research is the detection of users susceptible to fake
news. Work in [25] monitors the replies of Twitter users to a priori known fake
news, in order to tag the same users as vulnerable to disinformation or not. Then,
a supervised classification task is launched, to train a model able to classify
gullible users, according to content-, user-, and network-based features.
6 Conclusions
Inspired by recent literature that shows how disinformation is not only pro-
moted by social bots but also emphasized by genuine peers, in this work we
proposed a supervised classification engine to discriminate credulous users, i.e.,
human-operated accounts with a high percentage of bots as friends. The clas-
sifier achieves very good performances and avoids a heavy feature engineering
and extraction phase. Further research efforts will be devoted to investigate the
behaviour of credulous users, as well as the posted content, to know more about
their peculiarities and the quality of information they contribute to diffuse.
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